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FRAMING ISSUES AND ACQUIRING CODES: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE SOJOURN OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Reginald C. Govan*
INTRODUCTION
Academics have written prolifically on the distinct issues of em-
ployment discrimination and affirmative action because federal leg-
islators, executive branch enforcement agencies, and judges continue
to struggle to craft an appropriate mix of public policies to imple-
ment the equality guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Professor Epstein's article is intriguing
and provocative, as are those of Professors Strauss and Abrams.
However, many of the issues they raise-from total repeal of stat-
utes prohibiting discrimination to the abandonment of a single uni-
fying "reasonable person" or "reasonable woman" standard to eval-
uate the legality of behavior toward women in the workplace-bear
little resemblance to the employment discrimination and affirmative
action issues that preoccupied Congress and the public during the
past two years.
Accordingly, my article is markedly different than those of my
colleagues. I do not present a theoretical framework to rationalize
the development-or as Professor Epstein has declared, misdevelop-
ment-of equal employment and affirmative action law during the
past quarter-century, although I certainly have notions of what we
have done right and where we have gone wrong. Rather, as best I
can, I summarize the two-year legislative sojourn of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 ("1991 Act").1 Senator Thomas A. Daschle, a Demo-
* Counsel, Committee on Education and Labor, United States House of Representatives. B.A.,
1975, Carnegie-Mellon University; J.D., 1978, University of Pennsylvania. The views expressed
herein do not represent or reflect the views or opinions of the Committee on Education and Labor,
any Members of the Committee, or any other person or organization besides the author. The
author wishes to thank Anita L. Johnson for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
This article is dedicated to my father and two uncles-whose audacious commitment to princi-
ple led them during World War If to volunteer and serve in the Canadian Armed Forces rather
than the then-segregated armed forces of the United States.
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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crat from South Dakota, recently summarized the current state of
the legislative process as follows:
We debate in codes . . . . The whole game is a rush to acquire the code.
He who gets the code first, wins. It used to be a matter of who framed the
issue. Now that is not even necessary. It is getting the code and making it
stick. . . . It's a way to say we accomplished something without doing any-
thing at all. It denigrates the national debate.2
Enactment of the 1991 Act is both a simple story of the legisla-
tive process in the place that has been described as the "puzzle pal-
ace on the Potomac," and, ultimately, a complex story of a pro-
tracted political struggle between the Congress and the Executive
Branch to get the code and make it stick concerning a series of judi-
cial interpretations of federal civil rights statutes. I begin in Part I
with a summary of the legislative and political history of civil rights
issues during the 1980s. In Part II, I discuss the 1989 Supreme
Court decisions that were the catalyst of the 1991 Act. In Part III, I
discuss the three most contentious issues that Congress confronted:
first, compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional em-
ployment discrimination; second, an employer's "business necessity"
defense in a disparate impact case; and, third, "within-group norm-
ing" of the results of written employee selection tests.
I. POLITICAL HISTORY OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
To fully understand the two-year congressional and public debate
concerning the Civil Rights Act of 1991, one must have an appreci-
ation of the political history of federal civil rights legislation. The
majestic civil rights legislation of the 1960s-just some thirty years
ago-enshrined for only the second time in our history a national
policy against discrimination in most areas of public life. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.of 1964 a codified a principle of nondiscrimi-
nation in employment. The Voting Rights Act of 19651 prohibited
discrimination in the exercise of the franchise and required the
eleven southern states that made up the old Confederacy to submit
any future changes in their voting laws to the Department of Justice
for approval. The Fair Housing Act of 19681 established the right to
buy, sell, lease, and finance real property free from discrimination.
2. Helen Dewar, On Capitol Hill, Symbols Triumph, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at Al.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988).
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Title 1I of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 prohibited discrimination in
the provision of public accommodations. However, that legislation
was flawed by compromises northern Democrats negotiated with
moderate (but scarcely few) conservative Republicans in order to
break the hammerlock southern segregationists held on the national
legislature during the 1950s and 1960s. The issue compromised was
not the principle of nondiscrimination, but rather how the newly
codified rights were to be enforced.
During the 1970s and continuing through the decade of the
1980s, Congress amended each of the civil rights acts to strengthen
the enforcement provisions of these laws. In 1972, Congress signifi-
cantly expanded Title VII's jurisdiction to include private employers
with fifteen or more full-time employees and employees of state and
local government, educational institutions, and the federal govern-
ment.7 It also empowered the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") to file lawsuits against employers when it was
unable to conciliate charges of discrimination.8
Congress also attempted to amend Title VII to give the EEOC
the same enforcement authority that the National Labor Relations
Board has had in labor relations cases-that of cease and desist au-
thority, which enables the agency to order an employer to cease and
desist from unlawful practices and, if the employer fails to do so, to
petition a federal court of appeals for an order of enforcement. 9
However, conservatives in Congress narrowly defeated that proposal
because of very vigorous, organized opposition from the business
community. 10
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1'
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988).
7. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)). See generally George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title
VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824
(1972).
8. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 706, 86 Stat. 103, 104
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to (g) (1988)).
9. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 4 (1971); see also Sape & Hart, supra note 7, at 836-45
(discussing the proposed cease and desist provisions).
10. See Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 269 (1971) (statement of Donald White, Executive Vice-Presi-
dent, American Retail Federation); Sape & Hart, supra note 7, at 841 (citing Hearings on S.
2515, S. 2617, H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor and Public Welfare. 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 375 (1971)).
II. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1988)).
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thereby overruling a Supreme Court decision which held that the
exclusion of maternity benefits from a disability plan did not consti-
tute gender discrimination under Title VII.' 2 The Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act reaffirmed the principle that when one discrimi-
nates on the basis of pregnancy, one discriminates on the basis of
gender. Once again, there was well-organized, vigorous opposition
from the business community because its members apparently be-
lieved, or at least argued, that the cost of providing maternity bene-
fits to pregnant women would bankrupt business.1 3
In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to eliminate
the requirement of proving discriminatory intent and to restore the
legal standard of proving a discriminatory effect, 4 which had been
the standard prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in City of
Mobile v. Bolden. 5 In 1987, Congress enacted legislation overturn-
ing the Supreme Court decision in Grove City College v. Bell,"6
which had interpreted Title IX of the Education Amendments of
197217 (and by implication Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
196418 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,19 and the
Age Discrimination Act of 197520), thereby reaffirming the simple
principle that institutions receiving federal funds may not discrimi-
nate.2' Each of these initiatives succeeded because of the propo-
nents' ability to get the code of "restoration," i.e. simply restoring
the law to that which had been in effect prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court-and making it stick.
After a decade-long struggle, Congress amended the Fair Hous-
ing Act in 1988 to establish an administrative enforcement mecha-
nisin in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, to
12. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Legislation To Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing
on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1977) (statement of the National
Association of Manufacturers).
14. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
15. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
16. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
17. 20 U.S.C. 99 1681-1688 (1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1988).
21. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1687, 1688 (1988); 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, 706 8(c) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6107 (1988); 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988)).
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provide compensatory and punitive damages for victims of housing
discrimination, and to permit victims to file lawsuits in federal court
as an alternative to administrative agency enforcement.22 And, of
course, there was the hard-fought and sometimes ugly battle in late
1987 over the nomination of then-Judge Robert Bork to be an Asso-
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court-a battle that implicated many
civil rights issues, including such issues as whether the Equal Pro-
tection Clause prohibits governmental discrimination against
women, the contours of a constitutional right to privacy, and the
legitimacy of a constitutional right to reproductive freedom.23
During the 1980s, however, Congress did not seriously consider,
debate, or vote on any proposal to strengthen enforcement of Title
VII. The reasons are simple. First, as discussed above,24 Congress
had enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Amendments of
1972 to strengthen Title VII enforcement, and the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978 to plug a gaping hole in Title VII enforce-
ment created by the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert.2 5 Second, during the 1980s Congress was preoccu-
pied with a series of legal policy disputes with the Reagan-Bush Ad-
ministration concerning the appropriate parameters of lawful affirm-
ative action and the strength and vitality of federal agency
enforcement of civil rights laws.26
Opponents of affirmative action brought their case to. the public,
to Congress, and to the courts. They probably won the battle for
public opinion, but Congress.rarely provided a legislative forum for
their ideas. Moreover, the Reagan Administration unsuccessfully ar-
gued against the legality of affirmative action in a series of cases
before the Supreme Court.2 7 In addition, when then Assistant Attor-
ney General for Civil Rights William Bradford Reynolds proposed
22. Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3613 (1988)). See generally Jeffrey D. Robinson, Fair Housing Act Amend-
ments of 1988, in ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990s, at
304 (Reginald C. Govan & W. Taylor eds., 1989) [hereinafter ONE NATION] (discussing the
legislative history and key provisions of the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988).
23. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE AN Asso-
CIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, S. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-
46, 30-36 (1987).
24. See supra notes 7, 10-12 and accompanying text.
25. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
26. See generally ONE NATION, supra note 22.
27. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 618 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987); Local 28, Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local No.
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
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to modify approximately fifty consent decrees to significantly curtail
or possibly eliminate the use of hiring and promotion goals and
timetables, few state or local governments accepted his offer. 28 Fi-
nally, the Reagan Administration proposed, but failed to act on, far-
ranging revisions of Executive Order 11,246, which requires federal
contractors to implement affirmative action programs.2 9
Thus, Congress had spent a decade debating and resolving a wide
variety of federal civil rights issues by the time the Supreme Court
in June 1989 issued a series of decisions reinterpreting Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196430 and section 1981, a post-Civil War
statute enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1870.31
II. JUNE 1989 DECISIONS
In June 1989, a series of Supreme Court decisions forced Con-
gress to abandon its reluctance to be drawn into a legislative debate
on equal employment and affirmative action issues. Collectively
those decisions rewrote long-standing interpretations of Title VII's
procedural requirements and substantive protections and severely re-
stricted the coverage of section 1981.
Regardless of the merits of the result in any one case-a couple
of those decisions arguably reached defensible, and perhaps correct,
interpretations of then existing law-collectively those decisions, af-
ter twenty years of rather settled law, reconfigured virtually every
stage of the Title VII process.
The initial flashpoint and harbinger of the series of decisions that
were to come was the directive of the Supreme Court32 to the par-
ties in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union"3 to brief the issue of
whether the Court should overturn its earlier decision in Runyon v.
28. BNA Survey Determines Most Cities Are Resisting Justice Push on Consent Decrees,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-10 (May 24, 1985) (stating that only the Arkansas State Police,
Buffalo Police and Fire Departments, and Wichita Falls, Texas, Police Department would amend
their decrees).
29. See 47 Fed. Reg. 1770 (1982); 36 Fed. Reg. 42,968 (1981). See generally Hearing on
Oversight Review of the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
and Affirmative Action Programs Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). Section 1981 was derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), which was reenacted with minor changes as section 16 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 64, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870).
32. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
33. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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McCrary.34 Decided in 1976, Runyon applied section 1981's prohi-
bition against racial discrimination in contractual relations to con-
tracts between private parties, thereby permitting jury trials and
awards of compensatory and punitive damages for racially discrimi-
natory employment practices of private employers .3  That request
by the Supreme Court unleashed a firestorm of opposition from
Congress, religious groups, and the civil rights and labor communi-
ties, all of whom filed amicus briefs36 essentially saying to the
Court, "Don't you dare." Ultimately, the Court, backing down from.
a frontal attack on the scope of section 1981, reaffirmed its earlier
decision in Runyon.3 7 However, the decision of the Court confirmed
the truth of the old saw that there is more than one way to skin a
cat.
In Patterson, the Court rejected prior decisions of every federal
court of appeals that had held section 1981 to prohibit not just dis-
crimination at the formation of an employment contract but dis-
crimination during the performance of that contract as well.3 8 The
decision also stripped away equal employment coverage for the 3.7
million firms with fewer than fifteen employees, which are not cov-
ered by Title V I1.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"' the Court concluded that
when a plaintiff proves that her gender played a motivating role in
an employment decision, the employer may "avoid a finding of lia-
bility only by proving . . . that it would have made the same deci-
sion" even in the absence of discriminatory motives.41 One unmis-
takable message of Price Waterhouse was that a little overt
discrimination in the employment process can be fine, provided it
was not the primary basis for the employer's action.
34. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
35. Prior to the 1991 Act, Title VII did not allow such damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1988).
36. See, e.g., Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United
States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-107).
37. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171.
38. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, CIVIL RIGHTS & WOMEN'S EQUITY IN EMPLOY-
MENT ACT OF 1991. HR. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 90-91 & n.89 (1991)
(citing, e.g., Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194 (Ist Cir. 1987); Hunter v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d
257 (4th Cir. 1976)).
39. Id. pt. 1, at 91.
40. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
41. Id. at 258.
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The decision in Lorance v. AT& T Technologies, Inc.4 held that
the six-month statute of limitations period for the filing of a Title
VII charge begins to run as soon as an employment policy or prac-
tice is adopted rather than when it is implemented or for the first
time applied to the particular employee.4" Thus, Lorance raised the
specter of employees seeking to protect their interests by filing
charges immediately after the adoption of any new employment pol-
icy that might conceivably be applied to affect them in the future.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Wilks,"4 "the
great majority of federal courts of appeals had adopted an overly
restrictive rule precluding all challenges to a Title VII consent de-
cree" after it had been approved by a court."5 In Wilks, the Su-
preme Court repudiated the rule followed by those courts and in-
stead adopted an opposite and overly expansive rule permitting
unlimited challenges by nonlitigant parties, regardless of the cir-
cumstances and regardless of how quickly after entry of the decree
they are filed."6 Wilks threatened to reopen dozens of existing de-
crees to perpetual challenge.
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,"7 the Court redefined the
"business necessity" test to be used in statistically based disparate
impact cases." Under Wards Cove, the "business necessity" of an
employment practice causing a disparate impact was no longer a
defense to be proven by the employer. Rather, the employer simply
had to proffer a legitimate business goal significantly served by the
practice, and the plaintiff was required to disprove it. 49
Those shifts in the legal rules governing federal equal employ-
ment litigation precipitated the introduction in Congress of the Civil
42. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
43. Id. at 911.
44. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
45. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 38, pt. I, at 49 (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d
Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988); Stotts v. Memphis Fire
Dep't, 679 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984)). But see Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986).
46. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 761-62.
47. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
48. The Supreme Court announced the disparate impact theory of liability in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Under Griggs, employment practices such as job eligibility re-
quirements that are facially neutral but operate to exclude disproportionately members of groups
protected under Title VII are prima facie unlawful. Employers may rebut the prima facie infer-
ence of discrimination bv showing that the challenged practice bears a manifest relationship to the
job in question. See infra part III.B.
49. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
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Rights Act of 1990 ("1990 bill")."0 Patterson was the least defensi-
ble of those decisions and became the engine driving the proposed
legislation. Patterson resulted in the dismissal of literally hundreds
of cases in which plaintiffs had proved intentional discrimination
and had been awarded monetary damages. 5 But the decision in
Wards Cove was the most important decision symbolically because
it overruled sub silentio the unanimous 1971 decision of Chief Jus-
tice Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.52 Patterson and Wards
Cove collectively energized Congress and its allies in the civil rights
community to develop an affirmative legislative proposal to restore
and, ultimately, strengthen Title VII and section 1981.
After eight months of drafting, the 1990 bill-House Bill
4000-was introduced in Congress on February 7, 1990. 53 What be-
gan as an effort merely to overturn the June 1989 decisions had
expanded during the drafting process to include overturning three
objectionable attorney's fees cases, which the Supreme Court had
decided during the 1980s,54 and dramatically expanding Title VII
remedies by authorizing jury trials and the award of compensatory
and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination. 55
The bill also extended the statute of limitations period for filing
charges from six months to two years. 56 The bill further established
a mechanism to reinstate any case that had been dismissed as a
result of the June 1989 decisions7 and to permit the filing of any
case that had not been filed as a result of any of those decisions.5 8
Not surprisingly, the administration reacted to both the June
1989 decisions and the 1990 bill by denying that the decisions con-
50. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990).
51. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 38, pt. 1, at 91; see also I Hearings on H.R. 4000, The Civil
Rights Act of 1990, Joint Hearings Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor and the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on 1990 Act] (statement of NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund noting that within a few months after Patterson, 201 discrimina-
tion claims were dismissed).
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. H.R. 4000, supra note 50. A companion bill was introduced on February 7, 1990, in the
Senate. See S. 2104, supra note 50.
54. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 9 (overturning Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I
(1985)).
55. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 8.
56. Id. § 7.
57. Id. § 15.
58. Id.
1065
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
stituted a significant break with established precedent or otherwise
undermined effective enforcement of Title VII.59 Withthe exception
of the Lorance and Patterson cases, it contended that the decisions
were a necessary "correction" of a tilt in favor of victims of discrim-
ination that had crept into the federal equal employment law during
the past two decades.60 Indeed, the administration had advocated in
briefs or arguments before the Supreme Court some of the very re-
sults the Court reached. 6
Notably, much was accomplished in the nine months between the
introduction of the 1990 bill in February and the adjournment of
the second session of the .101st Congress in November 1990. Propo-
nents held hearings and mark-ups in committees of jurisdiction,
voted in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and sent
the bill to the President. It is virtually unheard of for major legisla-
tion to be considered and passed by both the House of Representa-
tives and Senate the first time it is introduced. Generally, the first
time major legislation is introduced in Congress, hearings may be
held and a committee of jurisdiction may mark-up the proposed leg-
islation, but rarely will votes be held in either the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate, let alone in both.
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that the proponents of the 1990
bill lost the first round; plain and simple, the bill was not signed into
law. It was vetoed. 2 The Senate failed to override the veto.63 Had
such a vote been taken in the House, the veto would have been sus-
tained there as well.
However, proponents of the 1990 bill accomplished much in pre-
cious little time primarily because they established a consensus
59. See I Hearings on 1990 Act, supra note 51, at 370-78 (statements of Deputy Attorney
General Donald B. Ayer); see also Joe Davidson, Civil Rights Groups Turn to Congress To Over-
come Recent High Court Rulings, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1989, § 1, at 5 (noting that civil rights
groups would have to rely on Congress, not the Bush Administration, in recouping losses from
defeats in 1989 Supreme Court decisions); Bob Secter, Won't Seek Rights Ruling Reversal,
Thornburgh Says, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1989, pt. 1, at 12 (stating that the Bush Administration
would not support congressional efforts to reverse the June 1989 Supreme Court rulings).
60. See I Hearings on 1990 Act, supra note 51, at 366.
61. See, e.g., I id. at 365-66, 381 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Donald B. Ayer,
referring to Wilks, Wards Cove, and Price Waterhouse).
62. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RiTURNING WITHOUT My AP-
PROVAL S. 2104. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, S. Doc. No. 35, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
see also CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE TO S. 2104 AS PASSED BY THE CONGRESS, H. Doc. No.
251, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (outlining the Bush Administration's alternative to S. 2104).
63. 136 CONG. REC. S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (vote.of 66 to 34).
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within the Congress and the country that the June 1989 decisions of
the Supreme Court eviscerated Title VII and section 198 Is' prohibi-
tions against employment discrimination and that the law which had
been in effect prior to those decisions needed to be restored. " Sim-
ply put, the code of "restoration" stuck.
III. MONETARY DAMAGES, QUOTAS, AND RACE NORMING
During the two-year legislative and political battle over the 1990
bill and the 1991 Act, Congress had to confront and resolve three
significant, substantive issues in order to enact the legislation. First,
there was the issue of expanding Title VII remedies to include jury
trials and compensatory and punitive damages in all cases of inten-
tional discrimination. Second, there was the issue of defining the
strength and scope of the employer's "business necessity" defense to
an employment practice causing a disparate impact. Both of these
issues were addressed in the 1990 bill. The third issue-the legality
of "race norming" results of written employment tests-arose for
the first time several months after the President's veto of the 1990
bill on October 22, 1990.
A. Damages
Expanding Title VII remedies to include compensatory and puni-
tive damages and a right to a jury trial in all cases of intentional
discrimination was the one major provision of the 1990 bill that
neither responded to any Supreme Court decision nor restored the
law that had been in effect prior to June 1989. Plain and simple, it
was an attempt to strengthen Title VII remedies, privatize Title VII
enforcement, and strip the federal judiciary of its role as fact finder
in employment discrimination cases. Under the 1990 bill, all victims
of intentional discrimination who proved they incurred pain, suffer-
ing, medical injury, or other economic injury were entitled to an
award of compensatory damages.65 Punitive damages were to be
64. H.R. 4000 was introduced on February 7, 1990, with 123 cosponsors. H.R. 4000, supra
note 50. The House passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 273 to 154 on October 17, 1990, 136
CONG. REC. H9975 (daily ed.), and the Senate passed it 62 to 34 on October 16, 1990, 136 CONG.
REC. S15,399 (daily ed.).
65. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 8; see also HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR. CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1990. H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 38-42, 75-79 [hereinaf-
ter HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 6441; cf H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 206 (1991), reprinted in HR. REP. No. 40, supra note 38, pt. 1, at 11-12; id. pt. 1, at 64-
74.
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awarded in cases of particularly egregious or willful
discrimination." e
The rationale for a monetary remedy for intentional discrimina-
tion was neither complex nor inscrutable. First, as noted above, dur-
ing the previous twenty years monetary damages had been available
in intentional race discrimination cases.67 Thus, it was a matter of
simple equity to eliminate the preferential status of race discrimina-
tion cases and provide to victims of gender, religious, national ori-
gin, and disability discrimination remedies long available to victims
of race discrimination. Second, victims of intentional discrimination
often experience severe pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of self-
esteem, and sometimes medical injury, particularly in harassment
cases."' Those injuries, it was thought (and rightly so), ought to be
compensated for. Then-current Title VII remedies of backpay and
reinstatement did not compensate and make victims whole for the
full range of those injuries.6" Third, twenty-seven years had elapsed
since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 first prohibited intentional dis-
crimination in the workplace, and raising the cost of engaging in or
tolerating such discrimination might serve as a powerful incentive to
finally eliminate such practices.
Needless to say, monetary damages was the issue employers most
cared about. Expanding an employer's monetary liability from the
narrow group of race discrimination cases to all gender, national
origin, religious, and disability cases no doubt constituted a dra-
matic expansion of the employer's risk and would precipitate a sea-
change in the human relations function of Corporate America. It is
fully understandable that employers fought the 1990 bill tooth-and-
nail.
B. "Business Necessity" Defense
As mentioned above, the unanimous Supreme Court decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. held that Title VII prohibits not just in-
tentional employment discrimination but also "procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups
66. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 8.
67. Supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text; see HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR.
HR. REP. No. 644, supra note 65, at 38; cf. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 38, pt. I, at 64-65.
68. See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR. H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 65, at 38-
41; cf H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 38, pt. 1, at 66-69.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
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and are unrelated to measuring job capability."7 ° According to the
Griggs Court, "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem" employment practices that have a discriminatory im-
pact on protected groups. Contrary to Professor Epstein's view, Con-
gress understood, if not in 1964 when it enacted Title VII then cer-
tainly in 1972 when it amended Title VII after the Griggs case was
decided, that the statute prohibited intentional discriminatory em-
ployment practices as well as practices that, while neutral on their
face, disproportionately excluded significant numbers of women and
minorities from the workplace.7' In 1972, Congress evinced a clear
intent to ratify Griggs by giving the EEOC specific authority to ini-
tiate litigation to challenge employment practices that had a dispa-
rate impact on women and minorities.72 As was aptly stated in the
report of the House Education and Labor Committee in 1972:
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe
the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply inten-
tional wrongs. The literature on the subject is replete with discussions of the
mechanics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present
effects of earlier discriminatory practices through various institutional de-
vices, and testing and validation requirements.73
Codifying Griggs and its business necessity defense became the
single most complex and well-neigh intractable problem Congress
confronted. The business community and the administration con-
tended that too strong and too narrow a definition of "business ne-
cessity" would render the employer's defense illusory because "busi-
ness necessity" could never be proved. As a consequence, employers
would be forced to'hire and promote women and minorities by the
numbers-quotas-rather than face litigation they had no realistic
opportunity of winning.7 ' That contention had a patina of intellec-
tual justification and did not originate with either the business com-
70. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
71. Richard A. Epstein, Gender Isfor Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 981, 1000 (1992).
72. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
73. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EN-
FORCEMENT ACT OF 1971. HR. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144.
74. 1 Hearings on 1990 Act, supra note 51, at 364, 373-74 (statement of Deputy Attorney
General Donald B. Ayer); 1 id. at 669, 675 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber on behalf of the
National Association of Manufacturers and the Society for Human Resource Management); 2 id.
at 109, 119-21 (statement of Marshall B. Babson on behalf of the United States Chamber of
Commerce); 2 id. at 106-08 (statement of Barrington Parker on behalf of the United States
Chamber of Commerce).
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munity or the administration; it had been embraced by three jus-
tices of the Supreme Court: Justice Blackmun in 1975 in
Albemarle;7" Justice O'Connor in 1988 in Watson,76 and Justice
White in 1989 in Wards Cove." Of course, proponents of the Act
always maintained that the definition of business necessity was
neither too strict nor too narrowly focused and would not force em-
ployers to adopt hiring and promotion quotas rather than risk de-
fending themselves in a lawsuit. Nevertheless, "quotas" became the
code of those opposed to the 1990 bill; making it stick became their
central challenge.
As introduced, the bill required an employer to prove that a prac-
tice that had a disparate impact on women or minorities was "essen-
tial to effective job performance. '7 8 Generally, if the employment
practice could be proven "essential to job performance," then it
could be maintained. The business community and the White House
forcefully opposed that definition. First, as noted above, they con-
tended that the so-called "essentiality" test was too stringent; it was
unlikely that any employer could prove any practice essential to job
performance. While it may have been a mistake to define business
necessity in such strict and rigorous terms,79 it is also true that four
months after the introduction of the 1990 bill Congressman Augus-
tus F. Hawkins, then-Chairman of the House Education and Labor
Committee and the principal House sponsor of the bill, attempted to
respond on the merits to the legitimate concerns of business by
amending the definition in a committee mark-up.
Chairman Hawkins' amendment changed the definition of busi-
ness necessity to require the employer to prove that an employment
practice that caused a disparate impact bore a "substantial and de-
monstrable relationship to effective job performance. '8 0 Some repre-
sentatives of the business community privately stated that with that
75. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 448-49 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993-99 (1988) (opinion of O'Connor,
J.).
77. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1989).
78. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 3.
79. See Steven A. Holmes, On Job Rights Bill, A Vow To Try Again in January, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1990, at A25 (quoting Morton Halperin of the ACLU as saying, "We thought that, given
the current Supreme Court and its demonstrated hostility toward rights, the language had to be
stronger to get the result we think Griggs managed.").
80. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 3 (1990) (as reported by the House Committee on Education
and Labor), reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 644, supra
note 65, at 3, 4; see also id., pt. I, at 52-54.
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change business could go to court and win cases. One editorial
writer, referring to proponents of the bill, stated that "rather than
fight, they switched." '81 Other representatives of business and the
administration disagreed and continued to chant "quota bill,"
which, thereafter, became the singularly powerful rallying cry of
those opposing the bill.
Second, opponents of the bill also objected to the definition's ex-
clusive focus on an employee's "effective job performance" because
it failed to take into account the legitimate range of employer inter-
ests beyond the employee's performance of actual work activities.82
Punctuality, attendance, safety, consideration of an employee's rela-
tive abilities or skills, ability to get along with coworkers and super-
visors, and promotability were illustrative of the interests that oppo-
nents asserted were excluded by a definition of business necessity
that had as its exclusive focus "effective job performance. ' 83 Gener-
ally, proponents of the 1990 bill did not credit that contention.84
The third basis of the quota argument related back to the expan-
sion of Title VII remedies to include compensatory and punitive
damages. Opponents contended that an employer faced with the
prospect of money damages in intentional discrimination cases
would likely hire by the numbers as protection against being sued.85
Of course, that argument is illogical. Any employer who is likely to
engage in intentional discrimination probably will hire as few
women and minorities as possible. The business community pro-
moted and clung tenaciously to the quota argument for political rea-
sons because the monetary damages and jury trials about which
they were really concerned could not be opposed openly and
frontally.
Opposition to an expansion of monetary damages ultimately was
premised on a policy choice that victims of race discrimination
should get money, the victims of gender discrimination should not.88
81. A Useful Move on Civil Rights, WASH. POST, May 10, 1990, at A30.
82. See supra note 74.
83. E.g., 3 Hearings on 1990 Act, supra note 51, at 115, 126-28 (statement of Frank C. Mor-
ris, Jr.).
84. E.g., 3 id. at 82, 161-62 (testimony of Kerry Scanlon, NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund).
85. E.g., LABOR POLICY ASs'N, INC., SPECIAL MEMORANDUM: THE KENNEDY-DANFORTH CIVIL
RIGHTS COMPROMISE IS STILL A QUOTA BILL 90-109 (May 17, 1990) (stating that the "threat of
jury trials, compensatory damages, and punitive damages reinforces the need to have a quota-
based workforce to avoid immense liability").
86. See, e.g., 2 Hearings on 1990 Act, supra note 51, at 2, 55-60 (testimony of Ralph H.
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That translated politically into "what is good for racial minorities is
not good for women," and that is how it played in Congress. Em-
ployers and the administration could not sustain that argument, and
to make sure opponents could not sustain that argument, proponents
of the bill spoke of monetary damages in terms of providing dam-
ages to white women.87 That translated politically into "white
women ought to be treated at least as well as minorities."
C. Negotiations To Compromise
There were two distinct bases of opposition to the 1990 bill and
the 1991 Act. Generally, business had come to accept Griggs and its
formulation of the business necessity test. It had proven to be a
workable, balanced test that allowed employers a fair opportunity to
successfully defend themselves against charges of disparate impact
discrimination.88 Business had no affirmative legislative agenda dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s to modify the business necessity test and
probably was not prepared to expend significant resources defending
Wards Cove, which was an unexpected gift from the Supreme
Court. What greatly concerned the business community, however,
was the expansion of Title VII remedies to include jury trials and
compensatory and punitive damages. Its members' very legitimate
concern was the bottom line-what it was going to cost. 89
Baxter, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe); The Civil
Rights Bill, WASH. POST. June 25, 1990, at AI0 (editorial) ("Nor is it a problem for us if racial
and the other prohibited forms of discrimination are differently treated; they are different.").
87. Joan Biskupic, New Struggle over Civil Rights Brings Shift in Strategy, 49 CONG. Q.
WKiy. Ri:.P. 366, 367 (1991); see also Dorothy Gilliam, Playing to Worst in Americans, WASH.
POST, Oct. 25, 1990, at C3 (quoting Kerry Scanlon of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund as saying that "[o]ne of the unspoken but primary reasons for the veto was the desire
to prevent millions of working women, including white women, from getting damage awards in
cases of intentional discrimination and harassment").
88. E.g., I Hearings on 1990 Act, supra note 51, at 506, 514-15 (statement of William H.
Brown Ill, former Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); I id. at 695,
702-03 (statement of David L. Rose, former Chief of the Employment Section of the Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice); see also Tim Smart, This Civil Rights Bill May Fly-If It
Stays Light Enough, Bus. WK.. Feb. 5, 1990, at 35 (stating that American corporations have
grown comfortable with affirmative action and would not object to having the former rules re-
stored); cf. Oversight Hearing on EEOC's Proposed Modification of Enforcement Regulations,
Including Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Em-
ployment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 208,
209, 209-10 (1985) (testimony of Dr. Leonard Goodstein, Executive Officer of the American Psy-
chological Association).
89. E.g., I Hearings on 1990 Act, supra note 51, at 669, 683-85 (statement of Lawrence Z.
Lorber on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers and the Society for Human Re-
source Management).
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The other basis of opposition to the bill was rooted in a philosoph-
ical antagonism to the unanimous 1971 Supreme Court decision in
Griggs and to statistically based disparate impact cases. However,
many of those who opposed Griggs were not troubled by expanding
Title VII remedies to provide compensatory damages to victims of
intentional discrimination."0 Consequently, those opponents to the
bill did not always faithfully and accurately represent business's
true concerns. Although it should have been easier to satisfy the
concerns of' business than to satisfy the concerns of those who op-
posed Griggs, unfortunately the divergent interests between the bus-
iness community and the administration were never fully explored
or exploited during the battle over the 1990.
There were several missed opportunities and failed attempts to
negotiate a compromise bill acceptable to proponents, the business
community, and the administration. One missed opportunity oc-
curred shortly after then-Chairman Hawkins introduced House Bill
4000 on February 7, 1990. In a speech before the Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council-an employer-sponsored organization of
human resources professionals-Chairman Hawkins summarized
the negotiations that had preceded enactment of amendments to the
Voting Rights Act in 1982 and to the Fair Housing Act in 1988,
and he invited the business community to work with Congress to
fashion legislation to overturn the June 1989 decisions of the Su-
preme Court.91 During the succeeding months, 'the silence of the
business community was deafening. Another missed opportunity oc-
curred in June 1990 when Chairman Hawkins sponsored an amend-
ment to House Bill 4000, which was then being marked up in the
Education and Labor Committee, to remove the "essentiality" re-
quirement from the definition of business necessity. As a result of
that amendment Senator Jack Danforth (the sponsor of the amend-
ment in the Senate), several other Republicans, and southern Demo-
crats endorsed the bill.92 Once again, the business community failed
90. Joan Biskupic, Bush Caught in Contradiction over Job-Bias Remedies, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1196 (1990); Steven A. Holmes, Costs, Not Quotas, Worry Some Foes of Rights
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1990, § 4, at 4; The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: A Challenge for
George Bush, HERITAGE FOUND, REP., Sept. 28, 1989, at 8.
91. Augustus F. Hawkins, Address Before the Equal Employment Advisory Council (Washing-
ton, D.C., Feb. 22, 1990) (copy on file with the DePaul Law Review).
92. Joan- Biskupic, Bush Shifts on Job-Rights Bill, but Differences Remain, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1563 (1990); Sam Fulwood III, Key Senators To Unveil Modified Civil Rights Bill,
L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1990, at A20.
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to respond to that overture and a subsequent invitation to work with
Congress to fine-tune the bill. Nevertheless, during the summer of
1990, Senator Kennedy met with John Sununu and C. Boyden Gray
of the White House over two or three months and reached some
tentative compromises that ultimately were spurned by both Repub-
licans and the civil rights community. That was unfortunate. As a
result, a great deal of ill-will and bitterness developed between the
proponents and opponents of the legislation.9"
However, as a result of those negotiations, proponents of the 1990
bill again modified the definition of business necessity. The original
definition, which required an employer to prove the "essentiality" of
a practice, had been modified once to require a showing of "substan-
tiality," and was again modified to require an employer to prove
that the practice bore a "significant relationship to successful job
performance. 99 4 Additionally, as a response to concerns that the fo-
cus of the employer's business necessity defense was too narrow,
proponents substituted the phrase "successful performance of the
job" for the phrase "effective job performance."'95
Proponents of the bill also agreed to lower the strength and
broaden the focus of the business necessity test for employment
practices that did not involve selection. The new test required em-
ployers to prove such practices that bore a "significant relationship
to a manifest business objective of the employer," 96 a phrase strik-
ingly similar to the formulation set forth in the Wards Cove case.97
Finally, proponents agreed to limit awards of punitive damages to
93. Joan Biskupic, Partisan Rancor Marks Vote on Civil Rights Meas'ure, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2312, 2312-15 (1990); Ann Devroy & Dan Balz, Administration, Senators Discuss Rights
Act Changes, WASH. POST. June 15, 1990, at A4; Helen Dewar, Democrats Act To Force Senate
Rights Bill Vote, WASH. POST, July 14, 1990, at A7; Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Sununu
Blinked, WASH. POST., July 18, 1990, at A28; Steven A. Holmes, No Compromise, Say Civil
Rights Bill's Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at A14. These negotiations were preceded by
meetings between the administration and civil rights leaders. Cf Maureen Dowd, Trying To Head
Off His Own Veto, Bush Holds Meeting on Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1990, at Al (report-
ing the first of three meetings between President Bush, John Sununu, Boyden Gray, and civil
rights leaders).
94. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990) (as reported by the House Committee on the
Judiciary), reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, H.R. REP.
No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2 [hereinafter HOUSE COMM ON THE JUDICIARY, HR.
REP. No. 6441; see also id. at 7.
95. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 644, supra note 94.
96.. Id.
97. Wards Cove required employers to proffer evidence that a challenged employment practice
"serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
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the greater of $150,000 or the amount of backpay and compensa-
tory damages.9"
Another attempt to reach a compromise involved negotiations be-
tween Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the leaders of the opposition, and
William Coleman, a Washington, D.C., lawyer, former Secretary of
Transportation in the Ford Administration, and, more relevant here,
Chairman of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. In
the closing days of the 101st Congress, Senator Hatch, Senator Ar-
len Specter of Pennsylvania, Senator Jack Danforth of Missouri,
William Coleman, and others reached tentative agreements on seven
or eight amendments to the bill.99 As had been agreed to, Senator
Hatch presented the proposed compromise to the Administration
and told members that he would endorse the compromise only if
they agreed with it.' Knowing that their principal Senate ally
would "hang tough" and not support the bill, the Administration
nixed the compromise, understandably contending that it did not go
far enough to satisfy their concerns. 1 1 Nevertheless, proponents in-
corporated into the 1990 bill the compromises that had been negoti-
ated by Senator Hatch.0 2 The President vetoed the bill. 10 3 The Sen-
ate failed to override the veto.'l 4 Congress increasingly turned its
attention toward a proposed budget "deal," a tax increase, and ad-
journment. 0 5 The 1990 bill died.
98. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1990) (as reported by the conference committee on
Sept. 26, 1990), reprinted in COMM. OF CONFERENCE, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 755. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990); see also id. at 16-17.
99. See Joan Biskupic, Conferees Attempt To Rescue Imperiled Civil Rights Bill, 48 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 3248 (1990); Helen Dewar, Conferees Modify Civil Rights Bill To Aid Passage,
WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1990, at A4; Steven A. Holmes, Despite Changes, Bush Rules Out Rights
Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, § 1, at 12.
100. See Mr. Bush Against the Tide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1990, at AI8 (editorial).
101. See Holmes, supra note 99, at 12.
102. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (as reported by the conference committee on Oct.
12, 1990), reprinted in COMM. OF CONFERENCE, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, HR. CONF. REP. No.
856. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
103. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE TO S. 2104 AS PASSED BY THE CONGRESS, H. Doc. No.
251, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
104. The Struggle in Congress: Senate's Vote on Bush's Bias Bill Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1990, at BII (reporting roll-call vote).
105. E.g., Joan Biskupic, Failure To Enact Civil Rights Bill Laid to Political Miscalculation,
48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3610 (1990); Steven A. Holmes, On Job Rights Bill, A Vow To Try
Again in January, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1990, at A25; Nathaniel C. Nash, Here's a Twist: Gains
Tax Is Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1990, at DI.
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D. 102d Congress and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
In 1991, the new Civil Rights Act proceeded on two distinct
tracks. First, Senator Kennedy did not reintroduce a bill, but House
Democratic leadership support solidified behind House Bill 1, intro-
duced on January 3, 1991 by Congressman Jack Brooks, Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee.106 Second, in a dramatic break
with the year-long strategy of the business community, the Business
Roundtable, an organization of chief executive officers of approxi-
mately fifty of the largest corporations in America, secretly initiated
direct negotiations with the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
an umbrella organization of civil rights and other organizations. 107
Full-blown negotiations between the Business Roundtable and
civil rights organizations took place for several months but failed to
produce an agreement. In theory, those negotiations made sense.
The people who sue (the civil rights community) should talk with
those who get sued (the business community) to try to hammer out
a compromise. But the world of hardball politics supplanted theory.
According to media reports, those negotiators had reached agree-
ment on most issues when the Administration rallied elements of the
business community not represented by the Business Roundtable to
repudiate the negotiations. 108 The Roundtable represented only the
largest companies to the exclusion of small and medium businesses,
whose legitimate interests differed from those of big business.
Many other reasons, however, also explain why the Roundtable
negotiations collapsed. For example, it simply may have been too
late for third parties, however well intentioned, to impose a solution
on what had developed into a national political contest between the
Congress and the President. 0 9 The political process had not sanc-
106. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also Biskupic, supra note 87.
107. Steven A. Holmes, Rights and Business Groups Seek Pact on a Job Bias Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1991, at 11; Anne Kornhauser, Business Roundtable Takes a Seat at Talks on Civil
Rights Legislation, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991, at 5; Gary Lee, Behind Closed Doors, Civil
Rights Compromise: Leaders, Business May Reach Deal on Bill, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1991, at
A16; Tim Smart et al., The Civil Rights Brawl Is Back-As Ugly as Ever, Bus, WK.. Mar. 25,
1991, at 44.
108. Steven A. Holmes, How the Talks that Raised Hopes for a Civil Rights Measure Stalled,
N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 21, 1991, § 1, at 18; Steven A. Holmes, Business and Rights Groups Fail in
Effort To Draft Bill on Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991, § I, at 1.
109. See articles cited supra note 108; Letter from Representative Craig A. Washington to
Ralph G. Neas, Executive Director, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (on file with the
DePaul Law Review). Representative Washington stated:
My immediate concern . . . deals with the negotiation process between the members
of the Leadership Conference and the Business Roundtable. Unfortunately, Members
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tioned the initiation of such negotiations. Moreover, the negotiations
failed to reach a timely compromise on monetary remedies, an issue
of critical concern to the Business Roundtable as well as business
generally. At no time prior to or during those negotiations was there
sufficient political support, in the context of everything else provided
in the legislation, for virtually unlimited compensatory and punitive
damages for women, religious minorities, and the disabled.
E. Within-Group Norming or Race Norming
The one new issue that Congress confronted in 1991 was a prac-
tice called within-group norming or race norming." 0° It was a politi-
cally charged, divisive issue that could have killed the proposed bill.
Within-group norming is a device that the EEOC and the Depart-
ment of Labor promoted during the 1980s to adjust scores on writ-
ten employment tests."' It is premised on the notion that certain
groups of otherwise qualified employees, be they hispanics or blacks
or women, do not perform as well as white males on written employ-
ment tests. The practice of within-group norming scores and ranks
each group of test takers separately rather than against all other
test takers. Thus when an employer considers the top fifteen or
twenty test takers, the pool includes some of the top white male
candidates, some of the top Hispanic candidates, and so on, group
by group.
Many proponents of the 1990 bill and of House Bill 1 concluded
that within-group norming was racial or ethnic or gender queuing
of Congress have not been made a part of these negotiations. Members of Congress
must be involved in these negotiations. Negotiations must not take place on behalf of
Legislators.
Id.; see also 137 CONG. REC. H2573 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1991) (statement of Rep. Steve Gunder-
son). Representative Gunderson stated:
That two interest groups can self-appoint their organizations to go into negotia-
tions, and if those two interest groups reach a common ground, they can somehow
order and impose that solution on the Congress of the United States and the Presi-
dent? There was not one elected official, not one Member of Congress, not one Sena-
tor, not one person from the administration involved in those negotiations.
Id.
110. Linda S. Gottfredson, When Job-Testing 'Fairness' Is Nothing but a Quota, WALL ST. J..
Dec. 6, 1990, at AI8 (op-ed).
11. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING VALIDITY GENERAL-
IZATION, MINORITY ISSUES, AND THE GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY (John A. Hartigan &
Alexandra K. Wigdor eds., 1989); see also Evan J. Kemp,.Jr., 'Race Norming' Is Against Our
Policy, WALL ST. J.. Dec. 20, 1990, at § A, at 17 (letter) (taking issue with Linda S. Gottfred-
son's Dec. 6, 1990 op-ed article, cited supra note 110).
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and one of the clearest examples imaginable of quotas in the work-
place. It was interesting that the practice took so long to surface
because during all of Congress' consideration of the 1990 bill, pro-
ponents had challenged opponents to produce some evidence that
quotas either were inherent in or resulted from disparate impact
cases as they had charged. Within-group norming was the answer to
that challenge. Many proponents of the bill viewed within-group
norming as the functional equivalent of point shaving in basketball,
and in the political context it was dynamite.
An amendment to prohibit within-group norming was offered in
the Judiciary Committee mark-up of House Bill 1. Because the is-
sue had not been explored at hearings on the bill, that amendment
was defeated on a party-line vote." 2 Consequently, Republicans
thought that the Democrats were prepared to go to the floor of the
House and defend within-group norming. Opponents of the bill
would have had a field day. Instead, immediately following that
vote, Democrats decided just the opposite-that they were going to
make within-group norming illegal, and that is exactly what they
did.1 3 As a result, within-group norming did not become the politi-
cally destructive issue that it could have become.
Building on concepts discussed (and tentatively agreed to) during
the Roundtable negotiations, House Bill 1, as passed by the House,
embodied a new definition of business necessity that broadened the
focus of the employer's business necessity defense to include consid-
eration of an employee's punctuality, attendance, and insubordina-
tion in addition to actual work activities." 4
House Bill 1 also explicitly affirmed that an employer had the
right to determine the requirements for a job." 5 Any employer
could now point to a section in Title VII that provided explicit stat-
utory authority to set high requirements. Finally, House Bill I ex-
plicitly affirmed employers' right to rely upon the relative qualifica-
tions or skills of employees in making employment decisions."' That
112. Joan Biskupic, Son of Quotas, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1287 (1991); see also Letter
from Representative Henry J. Hyde to Members of the House of Representatives (May 21, 1991)
(on file with the DePaul Law Review).
113. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 116 (1991) (as reported by the House Committee on
Rules), reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1.
HR. REP. No. 83, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 24-25 (1991).
114. Id. § 101, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 113, at 14-15.
115. Id. § lII(a)(1), reprinted in H.R. REP. No, 83, supra note 113, at 20.
116. Id. § 102, reprinted in HR. REP. No. 83, supra note 113, at 15-16.
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meant an employer could pick a person who had a better test score
over someone who had an acceptable score even though both persons
were capable of performing the job.
The House also adopted new legislative language designed to in-
sulate the bill from the quota attack. Proponents of the bill con-
cluded that the quota argument was a political issue that they had
not effectively dealt with. There were two reasons: First, the argu-
ment tapped into a very real, sometimes open but other times latent,
frustration in the workplace that white males in the employment
line have been asked to step aside for women and minorities.1 17 Sec-
ond, because the quota slogan ultimately was not tied- to any partic-
ular section of the bill, it was difficult to draft alternative statutory
language to respond to a slogan. As a consequence, some observers
concluded that the proponents had decided to meet a political argu-
ment with apolitical response. 18
House Bill 1, as passed by the House, explicitly affirmed congres-
sional intent that the use of quotas would be deemed an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII. 1' 9 A quota was defined as a
fixed number or percentage of persons of a particular race, color,
sex, or national origin, without regard to individual qualifications.2 0
It is true that some observers who read that definition thought it
was too clever by half. 2 ' However, proponents were able to point to
explicit language in their bill, and only their bill, that evinced a
clear intent that the use of quotas would be illegal. Therefore, pro-
ponents succeeded in at least blunting the force of the quota
rhetoric.
117. David S. Broder & Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats See Growing Signs of Trouble in Polls,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1991, at A9; Tom Kenworthy & Thomas B. Edsall, Whites See Jobs on
Line in Debate, WASH. POST, June 4, 1991, at Al; Priscilla Painton, Quota Quagmire, TIME, May
27, 1991, at 20, 21; Howard Fineman et al., The New Politics of Race, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991,
at 22; see also, e.g., HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (1985) (examining white and black racial attitudes through the years).
118. Adam Clymer, House Democrats Hone Rights Bill in Effort To Gain a Handful of Votes.
N.Y. TIMES. May 30, 1991, at B12; Tom Kenworthy, Democrats Try To Veto-Proof Rights Bill,
WASH. POST, June 2, 1991, at A4.
119. H.R. 1, supra note 113, § Ill (a)(2), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 113, at
20-21.
120. Id. § IIl(b), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 113, at 21.
121. 137 CONG. REC. H3838 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (colloquy between Rep. Gephardt and
Rep. Brooks); 137 CONG. REC. H3943 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (colloquy between Rep. Tauzin
and Rep. Brooks); see also Adam Clymer, Plan Drawn on Banning Job Quotas in Rights Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1991, at A16 (stating that House Democratic leaders would allow employers
to use exact numbers or percentages in "hiring and promotion, but not if that compelled favorable
treatment for unqualified people").
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Through those devices, proponents of House Bill I resolidified
their political base in support of the bill notwithstanding a vigorous
antiquota campaign, replete with political commercials-radio and
television advertisements-aired in select congressional. districts
with messages similar to that which Senator Jesse Helms used in his
reelection campaign.'
Resolidifying the base of support in the House, however, was not
sufficient to get a bill enacted into law. House Bill 1 passed the
House with 273 yea votes, 123 which was the same number of votes in
support of the civil rights bill the year before. 12 4 Proponents added
approximately ten more Democratic votes but lost ten Republican
votes. Thirty-two Republicans supported the bill in the 101st Con-
gress and only twenty-two supported House Bill 1 in the 102d Con-
gress. 2 ' Two-hundred-seventy-three was well short of the magic
two-thirds (290) necessary to override a Presidential veto.
The action then shifted to the Senate. As noted above, Senator
Kennedy had not reintroduced a bill in 1991. Senator Danforth and
most of the group of Republican senators who had sponsored the bill
in 1990, however, occupied center stage by introducing their own
legislative proposals in 1991.126 To seize the political middle ground,
Senator Danforth crafted a series of real compromises on a variety
of otherwise contentious issues. Senate Bills 1407, 1408, and 1409
completely eliminated sections of House Bill 1 and other prior legis-
lative proposals concerning the extension of the statute of limitations
for filing discrimination charges to a period longer than six
months;"' three attorneys fee decisions that had been decided dur-
ing the 1980s;128 and the application of the restorative provisions of
the legislation to cases that had been dismissed as a result of the
122. Steven A. Holmes, Corporations Are Deserting Group Battling Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1991, at 9; Gary Lee, Business Lobby Reemerges as Rights Bill Opponent: Critics De-
scribe Advertisement Used in Campaign as Race-Baiting, Potentially Explosive, WASH. POST,
May 19, 1991, at A7 (noting that the Fair Employment Coalition was advertising against H.R. I
in 13 cities).
123. 137 CONG. REC. H3958-59 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (273 yeas); Adam Clymer, Rights
Bill Passes in House but Vote Is Not Veto-Proof N.Y. TIMES. June 6, 1991, at Al.
124. 136 CONG. REC. H9975 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990).
125. Clymer, supra note 123; Gwen Ifill, Goal Eludes Democrats as 9 in G.O.P. Switch, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1991, at BI0.
126. S. 1407, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1408, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); S. 1409,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
127. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 7.
128. Id. § 9 (overturning Independent Fed'n Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Evans
v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985)).
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June 1989 decisions, 129 cases that had not been filed as a result of
any of those decisions, 30 and cases then pending in the courts.' 3
Most importantly, Senate Bill 1409 compromised the issue of
monetary damages- in intentional discrimination cases. 32 For the
first time during this protracted struggle, a proponent proposed and
was prepared to accept fixed limits on both compensatory and puni-
tive damage awards. Those limits varied depending on the size of
the employer: $50,000 for employers of between 16 and 100 employ-
ees; $100,000 for employers of between 101 and 500 employees;
and, $300,000 for employers of more than 500 employees.
Senator Danforth, however, had not developed a political consen-
sus around a definition of the Griggs business necessity test. His
initial proposal-Senate Bill 1408-would have required an em-
ployer to prove that a selection practice bore a "manifest relation-
ship" to "actual work activities" as well as any other "requirement
related to behavior that is important to the job" such as punctuality,
attendance, job turnover. 13 That definition closely paralleled the
definition of business necessity set forth in House Bill 1, which had
failed to garner two-thirds support of the House of Representatives
necessary to override a threatened Presidential veto and had been
tarred with the quota label.
Nevertheless, when the time came to bring Senator Danforth's
legislative proposal, embodied in Senate Bill 1745, to a vote,3 po-
litical circumstances had changed and there was renewed pressure
for additional compromise to break the deadlock.3 " Eroding Repub-
lican support for another presidential veto forced the administration
to accept the fact that Congress intended to overturn all the June
1989 Supreme Court cases, including Wards Cove and Wilks, the
two decisions that the Administration aggressively defended and
sought to maintain.
Because compensatory damages were already capped, 36 Senator
129. Id. § 15; see supra text accompanying notes 32-52 (discussing the June 1989 decisions).
130. H.R. 4000, supra note 50, § 15.
131. Id.
132. S. 1409, supra note 126, § 3.
133. S. 1408, supra note 126, § 5.
134. S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced on Sept. 24, 1991), 137 CONG. REC.
S13,578 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991).
135. Michael McQueen & Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Thomas Battle, Duke's Rise in Louisiana
Raised Stakes for Bush in Ending Civil Rights Impasse, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at A18.
136. S. 1745, as passed by both Houses of Congress and signed into law by President Bush,
divided the single $100,000 limit into two categories-$100,000 for employers of between 101 and
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Danforth and the Administrations' remaining task was to develop
yet another definition of business necessity. The deal struck on Oc-
tober 24, 1991, took a definition almost verbatim from the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act, which Congress passed and the Presi-
dent signed in .1990,137 that required employers to prove that an
employment practice causing a disparate impact is "job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity." 13'
By using a definition of the business necessity defense that faithfully
codified Griggs, Congress and the President concluded that they had
responsibly responded to and accommodated legitimate concerns re-
garding quotas.
The fragility of that deal was readily apparent to all seasoned
observers of the legislative process. The deal included an interpretive
memorandum containing a one-sentence explanation of the defini-
tion of business necessity that was to serve as the exclusive legisla-
tive history of that issue.13 9
Before the ink on the deal was dry, differences as to the meaning
of the definition of business necessity erupted in congressional and
public debate."" In an extraordinary response, Senate Bill 1745 was
amended to provide that the agreed upon interpretative memoran-
dum shall be considered the exclusive legislative history of the
meaning of business necessity. 41
Nevertheless, the public debate continued. One conservative com-
mentator wrote of "Bush's surrender on quotas," in part because the
Act required the employer to prove that an employment practice is
"'essential' or 'critical' to employee productivity or business prof-
its." 42 C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President, entered the fray
200 employees and $200,000 for employers of between 201 and 500 employees. Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
137. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 with, e.g., H.R.
4000, supra note 94, § 9, reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 644,
supra note 94, at 4-5.
138. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 with
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 103, 104 Stat. 327, 333-34
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
139. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,276-77 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
140. See 137 CONG. REC, S15,324-25 (daily ed. October 29, 1991) (colloquy between Sen.
Danforth and Sen. Hatch). Compare 137 CONG. REc. S15,233-34 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy) with 137 CONG. REC. S15,315-24 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
141. S. 1745, supra note 134, § 105(b).
142. Bruce Fein, Bush's Surrender on Quotas, WASH. TIMES. Nov. 12, 1991, at Fl.
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countering that "the proposal used essentially meaningless language
from the Americans with Disabilities Act that left the term in ques-
tion undefined.' 43 Civil Rights lawyers William T. Coleman, Jr.,
and Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., fired back: the Act requires employers to
prove "that job selection practices must be shown to be significantly
related to performance of the job in question. . . . There must be a
substantial relationship . . . between selection. criteria and job
"1144performance.
Despite that public debate, the political impasse had ended. The
Administration accepted overturning Wards Cove and the propo-
nents of the bill accepted fixed limits on compensatory as well as
punitive damages, albeit reluctantly. On November 21, 1991, the
President signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991.141
CONCLUSION
To this participant, the two-year legislative struggle culminating
in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 embodies large
lessons for the nation. The 1991 Act involved issues of political
power, legislative process, the proper role and efficacy of advocacy
groups representing business and victims of discrimination, money,
and principle that are beyond the scope of this article. The salient
message for employers is the privatization of enforcement of Title
VII through jury trials and awards of compensatory and punitive
damages in appropriate cases. Another message of the 1991 Act is.
the reaffirmation of a national commitment to laws and legal poli-
cies necessary to eradicate discrimination in the workplace. Most
importantly, the two-year political struggle over the 1991 Act dra-
matically reaffirmed the historical truth that all civil rights progress
results from compromise. Not compromise of the nondiscrimination
principle; since 1964 that principle has been and must remain invio-
late. However, the prognosis for continued progress toward fulfill-
ment of our national goal of equal opportunity is excellent only
when proponents of strengthened civil rights protections seize the
tenable middle ground occupied by people of reason and good will.
143. C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won, They Capitulated, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1991,
at A23.
144. William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the Civil Rights Bill Was Really
Passed, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A21.
145. Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc, 1701
(Nov. 21, 1991).
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